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| I did not take this photo. |
(The director of The Hauenstein Center in his introduction described Fukuyama as one of the top five political thinkers in the world. Who knew they had rankings on that? Is that the AP or the Coaches Poll? Will Fukuyama make the College Football Playoff? So many questions…)
Fukuyama rose to fame after the publication of his book The End of History and the Last Man, in which he argued that liberal democracy stood alone as the only form of government compatible with socio-economic modernity (opposed to say communism, as Marx had posited).
The New York Times, in a review of Political Order and Political Decay, wrote:
Over the years since, Fukuyama has continued to argue the case, and has now summed up his efforts with a two-volume magnum opus that chronicles global political development from prehistory to the present. A quarter-century on, he remains convinced that no other political system is viable in the long run, but concludes his survey with a sobering twist: Liberal democracy’s future is cloudy, but that is because of its own internal problems, not competition from any external opponent.Large, traditional powers like China and Russia are banging their drums and looking to expand their territories, while small, nontraditional groups continue to make noise across the Middle East and Africa. The hope we should have, according to Fukuyama, is for all of these states to get to Denmark. Not on the map per se, but to get to Denmark’s level of stability and low corruption. If Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, et al., looked like Denmark, the world would be better off. The problem is, we don't know how Denmark got to be Denmark. How did Vikings turn into social democrats? Maybe we'll never know.
Fukuyama argues that political order is held up by three pillars:
• The state, which is granted certain powers and responsibilities;
• The rule of law, which is a constraint on the powers of the state;
• Democratic accountability, although it’s important to remember that procedural accountability doesn't always equal substantive accountability. (Meaning, just because they say they're doing it doesn't mean they're actually doing it. See: voting in Afghanistan.)
These three pillars are necessities in a liberal democracy. Like the legs of a stool, unbalance one of them and order becomes wobbly.
Looking more closely at the state, there exists a difference between a modern state and a patrimonial state. In a modern state, there are clear distinctions between public and private. Corruption is possible, but it can be squashed through both the rule of law and democratic accountability.
In a patrimonial state however, the government itself is a species of private property. The king, ruler, president owns everything. The modern version is called a neopatrimonial state; take, for example, Ukraine. The democratic elections that precipitated the recent protests and rioting returned to power a president who had raided the treasury to build himself a massive palace outside Kiev. Soviet-esque corruption at its finest and most brazen. Other prominent examples of struggling democracies include India, Nigeria and Greece.
In Greece, ever since their transition to democratic rule, parties have won power via a system of patronage, rewarding supporters with civil jobs. And that’s been their downfall; Greece now has seven times per capita the amount of public workers as the UK. It’s not that these countries don’t understand democracy, or are incapable of practicing it, it's just that their democracies are immature. For most, they’ve been at it for less than a century.
It’s important to remember that the US hasn’t always been the beacon-on-a-hill of democracy that we are today. (That was sarcasm.) The system of patronage ravaging countries like Greece and Ukraine takes its lead from early 19th-century American politics, specifically the presidential election between Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams. A century of patronage tradition followed that took the assassination of James Garfield and the trust-bustin’ exploits of Teddy Roosevelt to fix. Democracy created problems of corruption, but was also key to eventually solving them.
Which brings us to political decay. Why is there still corruption in America? After all, the three pillars of our ‘stool’ remain intact and balanced. (Right?)
Fukuyama argues that despite America’s problems, we are not in decline as a democratic society. The rise in interest groups, though, is troubling. They are legitimate entities, but there is simply too much money involved, manipulating elected officials and distorting the views of the electorate. K Street lobbyists don't represent voters, just wealthy elites. Add to this mix intense polarization and extreme gerrymandering and you are left with the wide split between the parties that we see today.
The Founding Fathers, when writing the Constitution, wanted to maximize individual liberty, and as a result instituted the genius system of checks and balances that we know and love. Partisan politics, however, have led to this system transforming into what Fukuyama calls a "vetocracy", or a rule by veto. It is so bogged down and obstructed that necessary reforms to government are nearly impossible. (Case in point: the budget. Entitlement reform. Immigration. The tax code. Need I go on?) The US is a crucial model of democracy internationally, and we are simply not acting like a very good role model right now.
An audience member asked him if he still felt liberal democracies were the "end of history", and he said he did. Two-thirds of the countries on Earth have some form of a democracy. He admitted however, that the Chinese system is a threat to his thesis, because they have made a viable state despite running an authoritarian-style government, which may be attractive to developing countries.
Assorted notes:
- A broad middle class is key to sustaining democracy, making it easy to understand where and why democracy has failed, the most obvious example being much of Latin America. Social inequality often gives rise to populist politics, and the accompanying unrest and instability.
- Gerrymandering is a problem. Re-districting ought to be done on a non-partisan basis, as they do in California, to fix this mass polarization and huge incumbency advantage.
- Are instant runoff elections the solution, where candidates are ranked and votes reassigned if the voter's top choice loses? It would make it easier for third-party challengers to get their voices heard.
- In response to a question regarding Islamic extremism, he argued that ISIS is not a huge threat, but is made more viable by the vacuum of modern states in the area. The instability in the region results from an ongoing Shia versus Sunni civil war, which in itself is shaping up as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It won’t stop until they figure out it makes sense to stop fighting, similar to the battles between denominations of Christianity across the centuries.
- “The desire for democracy is strong but actually doing it is hard.”
After the talk, in the receiving line to get my book signed, I asked Dr. Fukuyama about neo-conservatism and if it is actually possible for a benevolent hegemon to even exist. (Fukuyama famously broke with Dubya and his merry band of neocons after the invasion of Iraq in 2003.) He murmured something about breaking with them in '03, which I already knew thanks to a quick pre-lecture scan of his Wikipedia page, and then said something along the lines of "we underestimated the hard military power that was needed." No shit. I was hustled through without another follow-up.
My original question, though, asked if a superpower is ever able to truly act benevolently when aiding, interfering with, or invading another state. True-believer neocons would probably say yes, in that the adoption of democracy is worth any unrest or upheaval caused. The quagmire of Iraq, in my opinion, is proof enough that it is actually not worth it. Reality bites, as they say.
